This article uses theory and experiments to investigate voluntary-threat approaches for regulating nonpoint source water pollution. The policies allow a group of polluters to voluntarily meet a pollution standard, under threat of a mandatory tax policy to be implemented in the case of noncompliance. Building upon recent work by Segerson and Wu (2006) , who propose what we label an "exogenous" voluntary-threat approach, we develop an "endogenous" voluntary-threat approach wherein the severity of the threatened tax policy is increasing in the level of noncompliance in the voluntary stage. This endogenous mechanism offers theoretical advantages; in particular it can be parameterized so as to induce a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the elimination of equilibria in which firms engage in zero abatement. Experimental evidence suggests that the level of the threshold for the ambient tax and the opportunity for communication play critical roles in determining policy outcomes. JEL: H23, Q53, C92
Improvements in surface water quality since the passage of the Federal Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972 are primarily a result of emissions reductions from point sources, such as wastewater treatment plants and factories. While opportunities for further point source reductions remain, nonpoint source pollution presently represents the greatest share of surface water impairment in the United States (Ribaudo 2003) . Agricultural production, which occurs on approximately 60% of nonfederal land in the US (USDA-ERS 2002) , is the largest contributor to nonpoint source water pollution and the leading source of water quality impairments among the rivers and lakes surveyed in the 2000 National Water Quality Inventory (US EPA 2000) .
Given the prominence of nonpoint source pollution, economic theorists have devised a number of mandatory approaches to reduce surface water pollution stemming from agricultural production. Motivated by the work of Segerson (1988) , the focus in recent years has been on mechanisms that regulate a group of polluters based on measured ambient pollution levels (e.g., Xepapadeas 1991; Cabe and Herriges 1992; Hansen 1998; Horan et al. 1998; Karp 2005) . These mechanisms can be used to address point source emissions, but are particularly well-suited for nonpoint settings, where it is prohibitively costly to identify and monitor firm-level emissions.
Although the economics literature on nonpoint source water pollution has mainly focused on mandatory tax approaches, policy makers have historically addressed agricultural pollution almost exclusively through voluntary measures, such as education, technical assistance, and financial assistance (Ribaudo 1998) . The purely voluntary programs have been widely accepted by agricultural producers, but there is little evidence that they have delivered water quality improvements that would warrant declaring them a success (Shortle et al. 2001 ).
Motivated by concerns regarding the effectiveness of purely voluntary approaches to controlling agricultural pollution and the observation that voluntary programs are more effective under the threat of regulation (Ribaudo 1998) , Segerson and Wu (2006) examine the theoretical properties of a policy that uses voluntary and mandatory programs as complementary instruments. Building on previous work on point source pollution control mechanisms (Segerson and Miceli 1998) , the key to their approach is to motivate firms into voluntary compliance by threatening the implementation of a relatively costly mandatory policy. 1 In particular, their proposed voluntary-threat approach allows a targeted group of firms to voluntarily meet an ambient pollution standard. If, however, the standard is not met voluntarily, then the regulator imposes an ambient-based pollution tax. With an appropriately structured tax threat, Segerson and Wu show that, as in the context of point source pollution, 2 combining a voluntary approach with a regulatory threat can induce firms to make efficient abatement decisions.
While the theoretical properties of alternative policies to control nonpoint source pollution have been established, economists have recently sought to examine how effective these policies are likely to be in practice. Although there is a substantial empirical literature evaluating purely voluntary programs (e.g. Cooper and Osborn 1998; Parks and Kramer 1995; Suter et al. 2008) , due to the novelty of ambient-based policies, empirical evaluation of these policies using naturally occurring data is not possible. Researchers have therefore turned to the experimental economics laboratory as an important intermediate testing ground for gaining perspective on how proposed policies might work in practice. To date, research has focused on experimental tests of mandatory ambient-based policies (e.g., Spraggon 2002 Spraggon , 2004 Alpizar et al. 2004; Poe et al. 2004; Cochard et al. 2005; Vossler et al. 2006; Suter et al. 2008b Suter et al. , 2009 ). The most favorable evidence from previous studies is on pure ambient tax instruments, which have been shown to engender highly efficient outcomes (Spraggon 2002 , Suter et al. 2008b ).
However, to date, voluntary-threat approaches to controlling either point or nonpoint source pollution have not been tested. Before advocating the use of a voluntary-threat approach based on its theoretical properties, or other criteria, experimental testing is an important first step to ascertain whether such approaches are likely to be effective in practice.
This article reports the results of experiments designed to test and compare the effectiveness and efficiency of two voluntary-threat approaches for reducing nonpoint source pollution. The first voluntary-threat approach that we investigate is the policy proposed by
Segerson and Wu (hereafter referred to as the "exogenous V-T"). The second approach, introduced in this paper, endogenizes the severity of the threat (hereafter the "endogenous V-T"), which offers some theoretical advantages. In particular, when taxes cannot be applied retroactively, the exogenous V-T has multiple Nash equilibria in the voluntary stage game, including a zero-abatement equilibrium. The endogenous V-T makes the severity of the threatened tax a function of the degree of noncompliance in the voluntary stage, which eliminates the zero-abatement equilibrium. Moreover, the mechanism can be specified to induce least-cost voluntary compliance as a unique Nash equilibrium. To gain further insight on the voluntary-threat approaches, our experimental design also includes pure ambient tax treatments.
Overall, our results suggest that the pure ambient tax and both voluntary-threat approaches are capable of reducing pollution below status quo levels. However, contrary to economic-theoretic expectations, tradeoffs in policy design, most notably in setting the severity of the threatened ambient tax, are likely to play a critical role in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of V-T policies. 
Theoretical Background
We begin by defining the first-best abatement choices, using a model that closely follows Segerson and Wu (2006) . Using this model, we then summarize the theoretical properties of the pure ambient tax and the exogenous V-T, and develop the properties of the endogenous V-T.
Consider a watershed in which n firms, indexed by i, pollute a common water source.
Assume that abatement can be represented by a scalar, denoted a i , and let denote the vector of abatement decisions by all firms.
which is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex, with and . Given that abatement is costly, in the absence of any p intervention it is expected that in equilibrium a ( ) ( ) 
.
and the vector of optimal abatement decisions can be denoted by . At the optimum, 
where TP(a) denotes the total tax payment owed by each firm given by
Note that tax payments depend on the tax threshold, x , but not on the standard itself.
Importantly, changes in x do not influence a firm's marginal incentives, but do influence the total amount of tax it must pay. The regulator can therefore increase the magnitude of the tax payments by reducing x below . In addition, the total tax each firm pays depends not only on its own abatement decision but also on the abatement decisions of all other firms.
s x
The efficiency properties of a pure ambient tax policy are well-known (see, for example, Suter et al. 2008b ). In particular, using the above model specification, it can easily be shown that, if , the pure ambient tax induces a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) in which all firms choose the efficient abatement levels for all
≤ . Thus, in equilibrium, abatement costs are minimized and ambient pollution is equal to the standard. Note that at the NE, the standard is met with equality even when the tax threshold is set below the standard, i.e.,
This would not be true, however, under a collusive equilibrium. With collusion, as long as s x x < , under the pure ambient tax the firms as a group have an incentive to reduce emissions below the NE, since the marginal benefit to the group of an increase in abatement by any firm is n times the marginal benefit to that individual firm. Thus, although the standard is met under the NE when s x x < , pollution will be less than the standard if profit maximizing firms collude effectively.
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The NE under the pure ambient tax for the case of n=2 is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows the best response functions, , for both firms for the case where
m is the level of ambient pollution under zero abatement) and s x x < . As shown, as long as abatement effort by the other firm is sufficiently high, each firm's best response is to abate just enough to ensure that ambient pollution is equal to the tax threshold (so that tax payments are zero). However, as abatement effort by the other firm is reduced, the firm is better off choosing and facing positive tax payments rather than undertaking the abatement necessary to * i a ensure that ambient pollution does not exceed the threshold. This yields the best response functions depicted in Figure 1 , which intersect at only one point, the unique NE, in which abatement costs are minimized and ambient pollution is equal to the standard.
The NE under the ambient tax is important not only for understanding the theoretical properties of the tax policy but also for understanding the incentives created by the threats under the two voluntary approaches, since it determines the cost to the firm of not voluntarily complying with the standard. Given that under the tax policy all firms choose efficient abatement levels and the ambient standard is met with equality, the cost to firm i from one period of the tax policy is ( ) (
The firm will incur this cost in every period under the policy and, as described below, under the voluntary-threat approaches during all periods in which the tax policy is imposed following voluntary noncompliance.
Exogenous Voluntary-Threat Approach
Consider next the exogenous V-T proposed in Segerson and Wu, under which the policy maker allows firms to respond to the pollution standard voluntarily, but includes a threat of a mandatory tax policy if the standard is not achieved. Specifically, if ambient pollution is above the standard in the voluntary stage, 7 then the tax policy described above, with s x x < , is put into place for K periods. In Segerson and Wu, once imposed, the tax remains in effect indefinitely.
Here we consider a tax that lasts for a finite number of periods, which parallels the structure of the experiments described below. In either case, as long as the costs that firms face if the tax is imposed are sufficiently high, firms will be induced to meet the standard voluntarily. 
, where δ is the discount factor. In words, the discounted penalty for not achieving the standard must be at least as great as the cost of abating to . voluntary abatement by all firms, this equilibrium is not unique for two reasons. First, there will also exist SPNE in which the ambient standard is achieved at greater than least cost when x is set so that at least one firm would be worse off under the tax, i.e., it is set such that ( ) (
for some firm(s). Such a firm will strictly prefer the voluntary policy to the tax policy and will thus be willing to voluntarily abate more than in equilibrium, implying that the aggregate costs of meeting the ambient standard are not minimized. These equilibria are illustrated by the overlapping portion of the best response functions in Figure 2 . Note that this overlapping range expands as Finally, we note that while the exogenous V-T leads to multiple Nash equilibria, there is a collusive equilibrium in which all firms abate to cost-minimizing levels and the standard is met voluntarily. Although collusion serves to weaken the threat of the tax policy in the exogenous V-T, as long as the tax threshold is set such that the cost of voluntary abatement summed across all firms is less than the cost of facing the tax, the group as a whole is better off achieving the standard voluntarily. Thus, in contrast to the pure ambient tax, collusion under the exogenous V-T can lead to a first-best outcome.
Endogenous Voluntary-Threat Approach
The third policy instrument we consider, which has not been discussed elsewhere, relies on an endogenously determined tax threshold. That is, the threshold in the tax stage is 
Note that the K period tax penalty in (6) can be made identical to one period of tax payment under the pure ambient tax policy by choosing a scale factor defined as , which reduces to
The equilibria generated by the endogenous V-T depend on the magnitude of ϕ , as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition: Under the endogenous V-T with ,
is a unique SPNE; and
A formal proof of the proposition is provided in the appendix, but the intuition can be gleaned from the best response functions depicted in Figure 3 . Figure 3a shows the two firm case whereφ ϕ > . The kink in the response function reflects the fact that, as under the previous two policies, if the abatement level of the other firm is sufficiently high, firm i's best response will be to undertake only the abatement necessary to ensure that the standard is met voluntarily and therefore that the tax is avoided. When the other firm "under-abates" (i.e., abates less than * j a ) andφ ϕ > , firm i will be willing to "over-abate" (i.e., abate beyond ), provided the cost of doing so is still less than the cost of facing the tax. However, when the abatement level of the other firm is sufficiently low, this will not be true. In this case, firm i's best response is simply to choose the level of abatement that minimizes its own costs, given that the tax will be imposed. The willingness of one firm to over-abate when the other firm under-abates gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria, as depicted in Figure 3a . This stems from the fact that, with φ ϕ > , over some range it is cheaper for a firm to incur the costs of over-abatement than to face the tax penalty. However, asϕ decreases, the range over which this is true shrinks, as the vertical and horizontal portions of the best response functions move toward the origin and the two kink points move up the constraint. Whenφ ϕ = , this range is reduced to a single point, namely, , as depicted in Figure 3b , yielding a unique SPNE. As Finally, group payoffs under the endogenous V-T are maximized when all firms voluntarily choose the cost-minimizing abatement levels and hence meet the standard voluntarily, as long as the threatened tax policy is sufficiently severe. In the case of the endogenous V-T, the threat parameter, φ, necessary to induce compliance under the collusive equilibrium is smaller than that required under the non-collusive SPNE. This is due to the fact that the increased cost of the tax following noncompliance in the voluntary stage is borne by all group members. Thus, as with the exogenous V-T, collusion under the endogenous V-T can lead to a first-best outcome.
Experimental Design
To test the performance of the pure ambient tax, exogenous V-T, and endogenous V-T policies, experiments were conducted at Cornell University in a designated experimental laboratory. Participants were undergraduate students who had taken at least one economics class, and the majority had previously participated in at least one ( seek first to understand the incentives created by the different policies in this simpler context, leaving the role of heterogeneity for future study. However, the theoretical results derived under the assumption of heterogeneity also apply to the special case of homogeneous firms, and hence can still be used to predict outcomes for our experimental design.
Each participant is provided an "Emissions Decision Sheet" that lists the firm earnings associated with all possible levels of emissions. Table 1 lists the assumed functional forms and experiment parameters, which conform to the underlying assumptions of the theoretical model.
The experiment earnings under a zero abatement strategy are calibrated to the net income of a medium sized dairy farm in New York State (Knoblauch et al. 2001 (Knoblauch et al. -2005 Suter et al. 2009 ). In Part A of all treatments, each participant makes an emissions decision in an environment where the group's ambient pollution does not result in penalties to individual firms. As such, the expectation is that each participant will choose an emissions level of 20 in each round, which maximizes firm earnings. Therefore in Part A the expected ambient pollution level, given that each of the six participants chooses an emissions level of 20, is 120.
In Part B, there is an ambient-based policy designed to induce a 40% reduction in ambient pollution levels, from an unconstrained pollution level of 120 to an ambient standard, , of 72. Reaching the ambient standard of 72 at least cost requires each participant to reduce their emissions to 12 units, from the unconstrained level of 20. The marginal tax, s x τ , is 2,500 in all treatments and at this tax rate, choosing an emissions level of 12 is a NE for all participants whenever the tax is in place, and is part of a SPNE in the voluntary stage for each V-T treatment.
The tax payment, if any, in a given round is subtracted from the participant's earnings for that round. To aid decision making, a "Tax Calculation Sheet" is provided to participants that includes the tax payment corresponding to different levels of ambient pollution. Examples of the Tax Calculation Sheet and Emissions Decisions Sheet are included in the Appendix.
Treatments 1 and 2 test the pure ambient tax policy with tax thresholds, x , of 66 and 50, respectively, with no communication. As discussed earlier, achieving the standard at least-cost is a unique NE for any threshold at or below the standard of 72. However, when the tax threshold is below the standard, the polluter group can maximize its payoff when participants emit fewer than 12 units. While collusive outcomes in the absence of explicit communication are not seen in recent experimental results when pollution is a stochastic function of total emissions (Suter et al. 2008b) , it is an open question whether participants behave in a collusive manner without communication in a non-stochastic environment.
Treatments 3-6 test the exogenous V-T under various tax threshold and communication settings. After the five pre-policy rounds (1-5), each group begins round six in the voluntary stage of the policy. As long as ambient pollution for the group is at or below the ambient standard of 72, the voluntary policy remains in place. If ambient pollution exceeds the standard, the threatened ambient tax policy is implemented in the next round and persists for three rounds, i.e., K=3, after which groups are again given the opportunity to meet the standard voluntarily.
Using three tax policy rounds allows for multiple restarts of the voluntary scenario while retaining the crux of a threat where participants pay a penalty over time for not meeting the standard, as suggested by Segerson and Wu. In Treatments 3-5 no communication is allowed. Treatment 3 involves a threatened ambient tax with a threshold of 66, the minimum symmetric threshold that theoretically provides the necessary incentives for voluntarily abatement. In Treatment 4 the threshold is 50, providing stronger than theoretically necessary incentives for voluntary abatement, but also increasing the range of SPNE. Treatment 5 provides the most draconian threat by reducing the threshold to 0.
Varying the exogenous tax threshold provides insight into the tradeoff in setting the threshold.
Reducing the threshold (thereby making the tax more costly) increases the incentive to abate voluntarily but also increases the range of possible SPNE and allows for the possibility of collusive outcomes in the tax stage. Note that in each of the exogenous V-T treatments there is also a SPNE whereby each participant chooses to emit 20 units (i.e., zero abatement) in the voluntary stage.
Previous ambient-based experiments have shown that group communication has a significant impact on pollution outcomes (e.g., Poe et al. 2004; Vossler et al. 2006; Suter et al. 2008b ). In addition, as discussed in the theory section, the V-T approaches can be parameterized such that least cost voluntary compliance occurs as part of a collusive equilibrium. In Treatment 6, the exogenous V-T with a threatened tax threshold of 50, under which voluntary compliance is a unique collusive equilibrium, is tested allowing groups to engage in "cheap talk" communication. Groups are allowed up to five minutes of cheap talk before rounds 6, 11, 16 and 21. During the cheap talk sessions, participants can discuss any aspect of the experiment, but are not allowed to make threats or arrange for side payments.
Treatments 7-10 test the endogenous V-T described above. Similar to the exogenous V-T, as long as groups achieve the ambient standard, the voluntary policy remains in place. If ambient pollution exceeds the standard in a voluntary round, however, then an ambient tax policy is implemented for the following three rounds. The tax threshold is determined by the degree of noncompliance in the voluntary stage. In Treatment 7, ϕ =1/K =1/3, so that for every unit of ambient pollution above the standard in the voluntary stage, the tax threshold is reduced by 1/3 of a unit below 72 in the subsequent tax policy rounds. Note that ϕ =1/3 corresponds to ϕ ϕ= if there is no discounting (i.e. δ=1), and each firm choosing to emit 12 units is part of a unique SPNE for this treatment. While we believe that end-of-game effects should be minimal, we cannot rule out the possibility that some participants discounted future period payouts. Such discounting would, in general, weaken the incentives for voluntary compliance as it decreases the expected costs under the ambient tax. As such, Treatment 7 would correspond to the case whereφ ϕ < , implying that in equilibrium firms would under-abate (and hence not meet the standard) in the voluntary period (see Figure 3c ).
Treatments 8 and 9 increase the scale parameter to ϕ = 1 and ϕ = 3 respectively, increasing the incentives for voluntary abatement. These treatments correspond to the case where φ ϕ > , which implies that, in addition to the least cost equilibrium, there are additional SPNE under which the ambient standard is achieved voluntarily but at greater than least cost (see Figure 3a) . In Treatment 10 the endogenous V-T with ϕ = 1 is tested under conditions of cheap talk and least-cost voluntary abatement is a unique collusive equilibrium. In all endogenous V-T treatments, the equilibrium with zero abatement is eliminated.
Experimental Results
In this section, the outcomes from the ten experimental treatments are reported.
Consistent with the related experimental literature, our primary focus is on the correspondence between observed and predicted emissions choices and overall efficiency. We further investigate the probability of voluntary compliance. Except where noted, in discussing our results we refer to the corresponding theoretical predictions under the assumption of no discounting, since, with the possible exception of Treatment 7, discounting does not appear to be a reasonable explanation for any observed group under-abatement. When discussing some of the results for Treatment 7, we specifically address the possible implications of discounting.
We begin by providing frequency distributions of individual emissions decisions across all ten treatments in Table 2 
Emissions
The frequency distributions of individual emissions decisions are provided in Table 2 Interestingly, in the ambient tax treatments and the tax stage of the exogenous V-T treatments, the modal emissions decision is, in each case, lower than 12. This reflects individual efforts towards tax avoidance as discussed in more detail below. Across the voluntary and tax stages of the endogenous V-T treatments, the modal decision is equivalent to the NE of 12 in each case, with the exception of Treatment 8, where the modal decision is 11. These results are at least indicative of greater decision-making consistency across stages and a greater propensity for optimal abatement under the endogenous V-T in comparison to the exogenous V-T.
Another means of comparing the exogenous to the endogenous V-T treatments is to look at the frequency with which participants choose zero abatement, which corresponds to emissions decisions of 20 or greater. Zero abatement is a best response under the exogenous V-T if the participant believes that other participants will under-abate, but is never a best response under the endogenous V-T. When the incentives generated by the threatened tax penalty are weak, participants choose the zero abatement strategy at a statistically higher rate of 38.9% (SE=8.1) under the exogenous V-T as compared to only 12.1% (4.5) in the endogenous V-T. At the intermediate threat level the zero abatement rate of 10.6% (4.3) under the exogenous V-T is not statistically different from the 7.8% (3.5) rate under the endogenous V-T. Finally, participants choose the zero abatement strategy when the tax threat provides the greatest incentive for voluntary abatement at a rate less than 1% for both the exogenous and endogenous V-T. Taken together, participants choose the zero abatement strategy in the voluntary stage with lower frequency as incentives are increased and participants choose zero abatement under the endogenous V-T at rates equal to or lower than under the exogenous V-T. It should be noted, however, that a non-trivial number of subjects do still choose a zero-abatement strategy in the voluntary stage of the endogenous V-T, despite the theoretical predictions to the contrary. This observed behavior could be attributable to subjects motivated by relative rather than absolute payouts, but we leave a more rigorous investigation for future study.
To facilitate hypothesis testing we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model that specifies individual emissions as a linear function of a set of indicator variables, which allows estimated mean emissions to vary by treatment, and, within each treatment, to vary across non-policy (Part A) and policy rounds (Part B). To allow for a possible structural break due to factors such as learning, mean emissions are estimated separately for two aggregate policy-round groupings, rounds 6-14 and 15-23. In addition, for the voluntary-threat treatments mean emissions are allowed to vary across voluntary and tax stages.
Because OLS coefficients are consistent in the presence of cross-sectional and serial correlation inherent in panel data but the usual OLS standard errors are not, we use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual-level (i.e., "cluster-robust" standard errors). In particular we use the heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance estimator of White (1984) and Arellano (1987) . Monte Carlo evidence suggests that test statistics based on this covariance estimator have the correct size for panel data with a moderate number of cross-section units, under various data generating processes (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Kezdi 2004; Vossler 2008) . By clustering at the individual-level, model errors are freely autocorrelated and conditionally heteroskedastic for an individual, and this error correlation is allowed to vary across all individuals. Errors across individuals and groups are treated as independent. Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of the Individual Emissions Model, where all estimated coefficients are interpretable simply as mean emissions for the specified treatment conditions. Echoing the frequency distribution in Table 2 , and similar to previous experiments that include a no-policy baseline (e.g., Vossler et al. 2006) , we find that emissions are not statistically different from the zero-abatement outcome of 20 units, with the exception of Treatment 3 where emissions are only slightly below 20. This can be taken as evidence that participants understand the decision-making framework and respond by choosing the level of emissions that maximizes their payoffs.
Turning to our analysis of emissions under the various policies, we focus on whether estimated mean emissions differ from 12. Although the focus of this article is on the performance of voluntary-threat approaches, analyzing participant emissions in the pure tax policy treatments is an important way of gauging the incentives generated by the ambient tax. The voluntary-threat approaches require that the NE strategy be chosen in the tax stage in order for the threat to be fully salient. Our overall finding for the ambient tax is that mean emissions are statistically equal to 12 when the threshold is 66, but emissions are statistically different and lower than 12 when the threshold is reduced to 50.
The low emissions level observed in the ambient tax treatment with the threshold of 50 contrasts with the findings of Suter et al. (2008b) , where the tax threshold is found not to have a significant influence on average emission decisions. By reducing emissions below the NE level, participants are effectively engaging in tacit collusion, which increases payoffs to the group.
One explanation for the lack of correspondence between the two studies with respect to outcomes under the ambient tax is that Suter et al. consider a case where ambient pollution is a stochastic function of emissions. Stochastic factors in the public monitoring of group behavior have been shown to make collusion more difficult in previous experimental studies (e.g.,
Feinberg and Snyder 2002; Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009).
The econometric results presented in Table 3 Voluntary compliance in the face of opportunities to communicate is consistent with the predicted outcome under a collusive equilibrium (as well as the outcome under the SPNE).
Under both the exogenous and endogenous V-T approaches, both individual and group earnings are maximized when all individuals voluntarily choose an emissions level of 12. Therefore communication provides a strong motive for groups to achieve the standard, since each participant and the group as a whole maximize profits when the standard is achieved at least cost. This is in contrast to observed behavior in experiments where subjects either receive subsidy payments when ambient pollution is less than the ambient standard or when the tax threshold that triggers tax payments is set below the ambient standard (e.g., Vossler et al. 2006; Suter et al. 2008b ). In these cases communication has been shown to result in inefficiently low emissions (i.e., over-abatement) since the group profit maximizing level of emissions is lower than the ambient standard.
Efficiency
The social efficiency measure defined initially by Spraggon (2002) , and widely adopted in subsequent experimental research on ambient pollution mechanisms, jointly accounts for mean emissions deviations from the optimum as well as variation in emissions decisions across individuals. We operationalize the calculation of social efficiencies through the introduction of a linear damage function that equates the ambient standard of 72 with social optimality. In particular, since marginal abatement costs at the standard are 2,500, the damage function starts at the origin and has a slope of 2,500. Although arbitrary, our specification of the damage function allows for comparisons across individual treatments in this experiment. Such a linear damage function is also consistent with most previous experimental analyses (e.g., Poe et al. 2004; Spraggon 2004; Vossler et al. 2006; Suter et al. 2008b ).
The economic surplus in a given round is determined by summing the pre-tax earnings of each of the six participants (the social benefit) less the social damage, determined by the aggregate emissions in that round. The observed surplus in treatment m, group g, and round t, , is then measured against the surplus in the zero abatement scenario, , and the 
Given the construction of the social efficiency measure, efficiency decreases as group emissions diverge from the efficient level of ambient pollution, and, given the convexity of the abatement cost function, as the variation in individual decision-making increases. The social efficiency measure is separately analyzed using linear regression with cluster-robust standard errors. The observational unit is the (group-level) efficiency measure for a particular round and errors are clustered at the group level. Efficiency is allowed to vary by treatment and, for the V-T treatments, by policy stage. The results are reported in Table 5 . Pre-policy outcomes, which are consistent with the theoretical expectation of 0% efficiency, are included in the model but not reported in Table 5 . A final result from Table 5 is that, when communication is allowed, social efficiency is not significantly different from 100% in either V-T treatment. Reflecting the high level of coordination afforded by group communication, not only do groups consistently achieve the ambient standard, but there is essentially no variation in emissions decisions across participants.
Conclusion
This article provides empirical evidence, through controlled laboratory economics experiments, on the effectiveness and efficiency of three nonpoint source pollution control policies. Two of these policies, a pure ambient tax and an exogenous V-T approach, have previously been presented in the theoretical literature. The third, an endogenous V-T approach that offers some theoretical advantages over the exogenous V-T, is developed here. Both voluntary-threat approaches give the polluter group the option of meeting an ambient pollution standard voluntarily, but implement an ambient tax mechanism upon non-compliance.
Importantly, from the perspective of the concluding remarks that follow, these three mechanisms can all generate appropriate incentives for groups to meet an ambient pollution standard at least cost. Our finding that this theoretical expectation is not consistently achieved in an experimental setting reinforces previous research in this area.
Of course, any policy conclusions drawn from our results are subject to the usual caveats connected with the use of a relatively simple experimental design and student participants. Nonetheless, our experimental results suggest the existence of some tradeoffs not implied by theory. The most evident tradeoff relates to the level of the threshold associated with the threatened ambient tax, which plays a critical role in determining the policy outcomes.
Increasing the incentives for voluntary compliance by (effectively) lowering the tax threshold in either the exogenous or endogenous V-T appears to have two effects: a) voluntary compliance increases with the severity of threat, as would be expected; and b) should the threatened tax be enacted, emissions and efficiency fall as the difference between the tax threshold and the ambient pollution standard increases. Thus, although a lower tax threshold is more likely to induce voluntary compliance, if the threat is not successful in preempting the tax, the result is likely to be over-abatement in the tax stage (consistent with results from the pure ambient tax).
We further find that non-binding, "cheap talk" communication, such as that which might occur in a small watershed (Weersink et al. 1998) , enhances the performance of the voluntarythreat approaches. This contrasts with results under other ambient pollution control mechanisms where communication drives group outcomes away from the social optimum, both theoretically (i.e., under a collusive equilibrium) and in experimental settings. For example, Vossler et al. (2006) demonstrate that cheap talk can push pollution levels in tax/subsidy mechanisms drastically below optimal levels, leading to a situation where implementation of the policy actually decreases efficiency. Suter et al. (2008b) show that, for damage-based tax mechanisms with varying thresholds below the ambient standard, marginal tax rates have to be adjusted for communication levels in order to achieve the desired ambient standard in experimental settings.
In the case of the voluntary-threat approaches investigated here, communication reinforces the incentives laid out for both individuals and groups to voluntarily meet the desired ambient standard at least cost. The intuition behind this is that individuals as well as the group as a whole are better off when the standard is achieved voluntarily. Since there are no additional monetary benefits to over-abatement in the voluntary stage, the group maximizes profits by exactly achieving the standard. In contrast, under the ambient-based policies investigated in Vossler (2006) and Suter et al. (2008b) , by reducing pollution below the standard groups benefit in the form of increased subsidies or lower tax payments, and as a result communication provides a catalyst through which to coordinate on over-abatement strategies. Given the benefits of Specifically, a better understanding of the tradeoffs between changing the number of threatened tax policy rounds (K) and increasing the severity of the tax in each of the tax policy rounds could provide important information. In addition, the policy relevance of this research could be improved by investigating empirically situations where participants are heterogeneous in terms of their baseline contributions to ambient water quality and the structure of their abatement costs.
Finally, extending the theory of the voluntary-threat approaches studied here to allow ambient pollution to be stochastic is an important future step towards improving their policy relevance. Tax  Exogenous V-T  Endogenous V-T   T 1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10 Emissions Part A 
, which is independent of ϕ . Thus, given ( )
all other firms choose , firm i will choose as well and is a NE in every tax period. 
..
where is defined as the level of abatement by firm i necessary to achieve the ambient standard with equality, conditional on the abatement choices of all other firms (i.e.,
Given that abatement is costly, firm i will never choose to voluntarily abate more than , since this results in higher abatement costs than exactly meeting the standard, without any benefit in terms of reductions in future tax liabilities. This result is independent of i â ϕ .
The K-T conditions corresponding to (a1) are, 
which implies that both (a2) and (a4) also hold for all i. , which implies a contradiction. 0 j μ = 1 Initial compliance with the standard is voluntary in the sense that firms are not legally required to comply. However, the threat of imposition of the tax can make compliance in theory a best response, suggesting that compliance is the firm's only rational choice. The type of voluntary-threat policies explored in this article are often included under the broad category of "voluntary approaches." See, for example, Segerson and Miceli (1998) . 2 Although Segerson and Wu (2006) were the first to apply this approach to nonpoint pollution, other articles have examined the combination of a voluntary policy with a background threat of regulation in other contexts. See, for example Segerson and Miceli (1998) , Lyon and Maxwell (2003) , and Dawson and Segerson (2008) . 3 In contrast to Segerson (1988) and related literature, the theoretical developments in Segerson and Wu (2006) and in this article do not explicitly consider the role of random factors such as weather. This is consistent with either a deterministic ambient pollution function or, as in Segerson and Wu, an assumption that the policy goal is one of meeting an ambient water quality standard on average. Under this latter interpretation, the term "ambient pollution" as used throughout should be interpreted as the expected value of ambient pollution, where the expectation is taken over stochastic variables representing weather or other random factors. Extending the theory to explicitly account for stochastic variables in the ambient pollution function would make a fruitful area for future research. 4 The assumption that all cross-partials are zero implies a linear relationship between abatement and ambient pollution, as in Hansen (2002) and Hansen and Romstad (2007) . This is appropriate if abatement is defined as a reduction in (unobservable) emissions, some fraction of which eventually enter the water body as "loadings", and ambient pollution is simply the sum of these loadings from all sources. Note that it does not imply that the damages are necessarily a linear function of ambient pollution. 5 Choosing s x x > does not make sense, as firms never have an incentive to reduce pollution below the threshold and therefore would not abate sufficiently to achieve the ambient standard. 6 Depending on the magnitude of the tax rate, abatement costs, and the level of the tax threshold, colluding firms could have an incentive to reduce ambient pollution to the level of the tax threshold, thereby avoiding tax payments altogether. With the parameters and functional forms used in our experiments, collusion by firms under the pure ambient tax implies an equilibrium under which ambient pollution equals the tax threshold. 7 Many voluntary programs targeting agricultural nonpoint source pollution involve incentive payments to farmers, rather than tax payments. In theory, a voluntary approach that ties the amount of subsidy to environmental performance will create the same abatement incentives as a tax-based approach (see Section 6 of Segerson and Wu (2006) ). For comparability with the pure ambient tax policy, which has been studied in previous experiments, we restrict consideration in this paper to voluntary approaches with tax-based threats. The performance of paymentbased voluntary approaches is an interesting topic for future research. In particular, it would be interesting to see whether the theoretical equivalence of the tax and payment-based approaches holds in the lab and/or the field. 8 An OLS regression was run with participant emissions regressed on the realized tax threshold, where the estimated parameter on the tax threshold was allowed to vary across the pure ambient tax, exogenous V-T and endogenous V-T. These three coefficients (while all significantly greater than zero) were not statistically different from one another.
